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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
__________ 
 
No. 12-2529 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
GREGORY GRISWOLD, 
                                 Appellant 
_____________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
 (D.C. Crim. No. 09-cr-00568-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Paul S. Diamond 
____________                            
 
Before: FUENTES, CHAGARES and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
____________ 
 
SUR PETITION FOR PANEL REHEARING 
AND ORDER AMENDING OPINION 
_______________________________ 
 The petition for rehearing filed by appellee, having been submitted to the judges 
who participated in the decision of this Court, is GRANTED, and the Not Precedential 
Opinion and judgment, filed May 2, 2013, are vacated.  An amended opinion shall be 
issued.  The amendment to the opinion follows:    
 Section II, last paragraph, is hereby amended to now read:  
 
 Here, Griswold made a timely request
3
 to proceed pro se, and we are 
                                                 
3
  Although made on the day of trial, the jury had yet to be empanelled.  Bankoff, 
613 F.3d at 373 (noting a request is untimely if made “after trial has commenced—i.e . . . 
. after the jury has been empanelled”). 
 2 
 
satisfied on this record that the Peppers requirements were met.  Although 
the District Court may have believed that Griswold’s request was made to 
obstruct the proceedings and delay trial,
 4
 it did not conclude that the 
request itself was equivocal or that Griswold’s waiver of counsel was not 
knowing, voluntary and intelligent or made by a defendant who was not 
competent to stand trial.  Cf. Buhl v. Cooksey, 233 F.3d 783, 797 (3d Cir. 
2000) (“A court may conclude that a defendant who intends nothing more 
than disruption and delay is not actually tendering a knowing, voluntary 
and intelligent waiver of counsel, and has not unequivocally asserted the 
constitutional right to conduct his/her own defense”).  The Court’s desire to 
prevent trial delay is certainly understandable, as is its frustration at 
Griswold’s last minute decision to proceed pro se.  Nevertheless, the Court 
erred by denying Griswold’s request.   
 
      BY THE COURT: 
     /s/Maryanne Trump Barry 
     Circuit Judge 
 
Dated: May 22, 2013 
                                                 
4
 The District Court stated that under Bankoff “the timing of the request is only one 
factor that a Court must consider” and that the Court is “obligated to balance the 
prejudice to the Defendant’s legitimate interests against any potential disruption that a 
self-representation request would cause.”  (J.A. vol. II at 34).  This discretionary 
balancing only occurs, however, when the right to proceed pro se is “curtailed” by an 
untimely request.  Bankoff, 613 F.3d at 373.  The request here was timely, and thus the 
Court should not have reached this balancing inquiry.   
